7e5db9a3c6
* fix(security): redact credential-bearing URLs and PII from logs Several log statements emitted sensitive data in clear text: - model_routes / chat_routes / contacts_routes logged endpoint URLs raw. Admin-configured URLs can embed credentials in userinfo or query (e.g. https://user:pass@host, ?api_key=...). Route them through a shared core.log_safety.redact_url() that drops userinfo/query/fragment. - note_routes / task_scheduler logged operator email addresses (smtp_user, recipient). Replaced with presence booleans, which keeps the diagnostic ("why didn't this send") without writing PII to logs. model_routes already had a local redactor on its HTTPStatusError branch; the generic except branch was missed, so reuse the existing helper there. Clears CodeQL py/clear-text-logging-sensitive-data alerts 264, 317, 324, 325, 343, 344, 528. * fix(security): re-bracket IPv6 hosts and single-source the URL redactor Address review on #4750: - redact_url now re-brackets IPv6 literals so host:port stays unambiguous (https://[2001:db8::1]:8443/v1, not the bracket-less ambiguous form). - point model_routes._redact_url_for_log at the shared helper so the two redactors are single-sourced (also picks up the IPv6 fix). |
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| .. | ||
| __init__.py | ||
| atomic_io.py | ||
| auth.py | ||
| constants.py | ||
| database.py | ||
| exceptions.py | ||
| log_safety.py | ||
| middleware.py | ||
| models.py | ||
| platform_compat.py | ||
| session_manager.py | ||